G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16905
DP16905 Price Pressure Indices, Innovation and Mergers Between Commonly Owned Firms
Roman Inderst; Stefan Thomas
发表日期2022-01-15
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要The potentially anticompetitive effects of common ownership are being discussed controversially. While the US agencies still display reluctance, the Commission has already invoked common ownership has part of a theory of harm in Dow/DuPont and Bayer/Monsanto. In our paper we focus on how common ownership can bear on the application of price pressure indices in unilateral effects analysis of horizontal mergers between portfolio companies. We do not assess whether the underlying premise of common ownership to lead to an internalization of shareholders’ expectations of high overall market returns is convincing. Rather, we hypothesize such common shareholder influence. Our main conclusion is that common ownership should still not be considered a general circumstantial factor indicating competitive harm with respect to post-merger price increases or effects on innovation competition. Rather, it calls for case-by-case analysis.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Common ownership Herfindahl-hirschman index Horizontal effects Innovation competition Merger control Unilateral effects Upward pricing pressure
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16905
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545837
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Roman Inderst,Stefan Thomas. DP16905 Price Pressure Indices, Innovation and Mergers Between Commonly Owned Firms. 2022.
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