| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16912 |
| DP16912 It's Payback time: new insights on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma | |
| Maria Bigoni; Marco Casari; Giancarlo Spagnolo | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In an experiment on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma where intended actions are implemented with noise, Fudenberg et al. (2012) observe that non-equilibrium strategies of the “tit-for-tat” family are largely adopted. Furthermore, they do not find support for risk dominance of TFT as a determinant of cooperation. This comment introduces the “Payback” strategy, which is similar to TFT but is sustainable in equilibrium. Using the data from the original article, we show that Payback captures most of the empirical support previously attributed to TFT, and that the risk dominance criterion based on Payback can explain the observed cooperation patterns. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric strategies Imperfect monitoring Indefinitely repeated games Risk dominance Strategic risk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16912 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545845 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maria Bigoni,Marco Casari,Giancarlo Spagnolo. DP16912 It's Payback time: new insights on cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
