G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16951
DP16951 Opportunism in Vertical Contracting: A Dynamic Perspective
Jihwan Do; Jeanine Miklos-Thal
发表日期2022-01-22
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要This paper proposes a dynamic approach to modeling opportunism in bilateral vertical contracting between an upstream monopolist and competing downstream firms. Unlike previous literature on opportunism which has focused on games in which the upstream firm makes simultaneous secret offers to the downstream firms, we model opportunism as a consequence of asynchronous recontracting in an infinite-horizon continuous-time model. We find that the degree of opportunism depends on the absolute and relative reaction speeds of the different bilateral upstream-downstream firm pairs and on the firms' discount rate. Patience, fast reaction speeds, and asymmetries in reaction speeds across upstream-downstream pairs are shown to alleviate the opportunism problem. Our results are relevant for vertical merger policy and for competition policy on vertical restraints.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Vertical contracting Opportunism Dynamic oligopoly Vertical mergers Vertical restraints
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16951
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545890
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jihwan Do,Jeanine Miklos-Thal. DP16951 Opportunism in Vertical Contracting: A Dynamic Perspective. 2022.
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