G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15230
DP15230 Corporate governance in the presence of active and passive delegated investment
Adrian Aycan Corum; Andrey Malenko; Nadya Malenko
发表日期2022-01-24
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We examine the governance role of delegated portfolio managers. In our model, investors allocate their wealth between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and fund fees are endogenously determined. Funds' ownership stakes and fees determine funds' incentives to engage in governance. Whether passive fund growth improves governance depends on whether it crowds out private savings or active funds. In the former case, it improves governance even though it is accompanied by lower fees, whereas in the latter case it can harm governance. Overall, passive fund growth improves governance only if it does not increase fund investors' returns too much.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Corporate governance Delegated asset management Passive funds Index funds Competition Investment stewardship Engagement
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15230-5
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545893
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Adrian Aycan Corum,Andrey Malenko,Nadya Malenko. DP15230 Corporate governance in the presence of active and passive delegated investment. 2022.
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