| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16959 |
| DP16959 Organized Information Transmission | |
| Ina Taneva; Laurent Mathevet | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-27 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We formalize the concepts of horizontal and vertical information transmission and introduce two families of information structures, namely single-meeting schemes and delegated hierarchies, that specialize along these dimensions. We characterize the strategic outcomes that they implement in general finite incomplete information games and illustrate the resulting linear programming approach in a linear network example. We build on the characterizations to show that these families are unconstraine-doptimal in binary-action games with strategic complementarities. Finally, we generalize these families to multiple meetings and random hierarchies and characterize the corresponding strategic outcomes. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Incomplete information Delegated transmission Bayes correlated equilibrium Information design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16959 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545902 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ina Taneva,Laurent Mathevet. DP16959 Organized Information Transmission. 2022. |
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