| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP16966
|
| DP16966 What Drives U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior? |
| Edoardo Teso
|
| 发表日期 | 2022-01-29
|
| 出版年 | 2022
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Do U.S. corporate elites contribute to political campaigns purely motivated by ideological considerations – as typically assumed by the literature on individual donors’ drivers of contributions – or are their donations also a tool of political influence? I investigate this question using a new panel on the contributions to members of U.S. Congress (MCs) by 401,557 corporate leaders of 14,807 U.S. corporations over the 1999-2018 period. I show that donations increase by 11% when a politician is assigned to a committee dealing with policy issues relevant to a corporate leader’s company. The effect is driven by donations to MCs with the greatest power in the committees. The estimates suggest that (i) 13% of the observed gap in corporate leaders’ donations to policy relevant versus other MCs is driven by an influence-seeking motive, and (ii) the total corporate leaders’ donations that are driven by the influence-seeking motive are about 53% of the overall donations by their companies’ PACs to all MCs over the same period. |
| 主题 | Political Economy
|
| 关键词 | Campaign finance
Lobbying
U.s. congress
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16966
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545909
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Edoardo Teso. DP16966 What Drives U.S. Corporate Elites' Campaign Contribution Behavior?. 2022.
|
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