| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15849 |
| DP15849 Double marginalization and vertical integration | |
| Philippe Chone; Laurent Linnemer; Thibaud Vergé | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-02 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Double marginalization is a robust phenomenon in procurement under asymmetric information when sophisticated contracts can be mplemented. In this context, vertical integration causes merger-specific elimination of double marginalization but biases the make-or-buy decision against independent suppliers. If the buyer has full bargaining power over prices and quantities, a vertical merger benefits final consumers even when it results in the exclusion of efficient suppliers. If on the contrary the buyer's bargaining power is reduced after she has committed to deal exclusively with a limited set of suppliers, exclusion of efficient suppliers harms final consumers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Asymmetric information Bargaining Double marginalization Optimal procurement mechanism Vertical merger |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15849-1 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545935 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe Chone,Laurent Linnemer,Thibaud Vergé. DP15849 Double marginalization and vertical integration. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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