| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17025 |
| DP17025 (In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation through Prices | |
| Alessandro Pavan; Savitar Sundaresan; Xavier Vives | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-10 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the interaction between the inefficiency in the acquisition of private information and trading in financial markets. We show that, as the cost of information declines, traders over-invest in information acquisition and trade too much on their private information. We also show that, generically, there exists no policy based on the price of the financial asset and the volume of individual trades that implements efficiency in both information acquisition and trading. Such an impossibility result, however, turns into a possibility result when information acquisition is verifiable, or when taxes can be made contingent on the aggregate volume of trade. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Information acquisition Aggregation through prices Information externalities Team efficiency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17025 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545971 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Pavan,Savitar Sundaresan,Xavier Vives. DP17025 (In)efficiency in Information Acquisition and Aggregation through Prices. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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