| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17028 |
| DP17028 Informed Information Design | |
| Vasiliki Skreta; Frédéric Koessler | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-10 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information- disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define interim-optimal mechanisms, a subset of incentive-compatible mechan- isms that are optimal in the sense that the informed designer cannot credibly find an alternative mechanism that strictly improves his interim payoff. We prove that an interim-optimal mechanism exists and that every interim-optimal mechanism is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of the informed-designer game. An ex- ante optimal mechanism may not be interim optimal, but it is when it is ex-post optimal. Likewise, the unraveling outcome in disclosure games is interim op- timal. We provide a belief-based characterization of interim-optimal mechanisms and compare them with ex-ante optimal ones in common economic environments. In settings with strategic complements and binary actions, every ex-ante optimal mechanism is interim optimal. We compare interim optimality to other solutions of informed-principal problems. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Interim information design Bayesian persuasion Informed prin- cipal Disclosure games Unraveling Neutral optimum Strong neologism proof- ness Core mechanism Verifiable types |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17028 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545973 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vasiliki Skreta,Frédéric Koessler. DP17028 Informed Information Design. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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