G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP15113
DP15113 Shelving or developing? The acquisition of potential competitors under financial constraints.
Chiara Fumagalli; Massimo Motta; Emanuele Tarantino
发表日期2022-02-15
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要A start-up and an incumbent negotiate over an acquisition price under asymmetric information about the start-up's ability to succeed in the market. The acquisition may result in the shelving of the start-up's project or the development of a project that would otherwise never reach the market because of financial constraints. Despite this possible pro-competitive effect, the optimal merger policy commits to standards of review that prohibit high-price takeovers, even if they may be welfare-beneficial ex post. Ex ante this pushes the incumbent to acquire start-ups lacking the financial resources to develop independently, and increases expected welfare.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Optimal merger policy Selection effect Nascent competitors
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp15113-1
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545984
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Chiara Fumagalli,Massimo Motta,Emanuele Tarantino. DP15113 Shelving or developing? The acquisition of potential competitors under financial constraints.. 2022.
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