| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17040 |
| DP17040 On Market Prices in Double Auctions | |
| Simon Jantschgi; Bary Pradelski; Marek Pycia | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-16 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We address some open issues regarding the characterization of double auctions. Our model is a two-sided commodity market with either finitely or infinitely many traders. We first unify existing formulations for both finite and infinite markets and generalize the characterization of market clearing in the presence of ties. Second, we define a mechanism that achieves market clearing in any, finite or infinite, market instance and show that it coincides with the k-double auction by Rustichini et al. (1994) in the former case. In particular, it clarifies the consequences of ties in submissions and makes common regularity assumptions obsolete. Finally, we show that the resulting generalized mechanism implements Walrasian competitive equilibrium. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17040 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/545995 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Simon Jantschgi,Bary Pradelski,Marek Pycia. DP17040 On Market Prices in Double Auctions. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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