| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17044 |
| DP17044 Risky Vote Delegation | |
| Hans Gersbach; Akaki Mamageishvili; Manvir Schneider | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-17 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study vote delegation and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples for vote delegation are validation or governance tasks on blockchains and liquid democracy. There is a majority of "well-behaving" agents, but they may abstain or delegate their vote to other agents since voting is costly. "Misbehaving" agents always vote. Preferences of agents are private information and a positive outcome is achieved if well-behaving agents win. Vote delegation can lead to quite different outcomes than conventional voting. For instance, if the number of misbehaving voters, denoted by f, is high, both voting methods fail to deliver a positive outcome. If the number of misbehaving voters takes an intermediate value, conventional voting delivers a positive outcome, while vote delegation fails with probability one. However, if f is low, we show by numerical simulations that delegation delivers a positive outcome with higher probability than conventional voting. Our results also provide insights in worst-case outcomes that can happen in a liquid democracy. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics ; Political Economy ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Costly voting - delegation - rational voters - governance - liquid democracy - blockchain |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17044 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546001 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Akaki Mamageishvili,Manvir Schneider. DP17044 Risky Vote Delegation. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
