| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17048 |
| DP17048 Matching with Recall | |
| Yann Bramoullé; Brian Rogers; Erdem Yenerdag | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-18 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a two-period one-to-one dynamic matching environment in which agents meet randomly and decide whether to match early or defer. Crucially, agents can match with either partner in the second period. This ``recall’’ captures situations where, e.g., a firm and worker can conduct additional interviews before contracting. Recall has a profound impact on incentives and on aggregate outcomes. We show that the likelihood to match early is non-monotonic in type: early matches occur between the good-but-not-best agents. The option value provided by the first-period partner provides a force against unraveling, so that deferrals occur under small participation costs. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17048 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546006 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yann Bramoullé,Brian Rogers,Erdem Yenerdag. DP17048 Matching with Recall. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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