| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16210 |
| DP16210 Market Competition and Political Influence: An Integrated Approach | |
| Dana Foarta; Steven Callander; Takuo Sugaya | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-22 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The operation of markets and of politics are in practice deeply intertwined. Political decisions set the rules of the game for market competition and, conversely, market competitors participate in and influence political decisions. We develop an integrated model to capture the circularity between the two domains. We show that a positive feedback loop emerges such that market power begets political power in a positive feedback loop, but that this feedback loop is bounded. With too much market power, the balance between politics and markets itself becomes lopsided and this drives a wedge between the interests of a policymaker and the dominant firm. Although such a wedge would seem pro-competitive, we show how it can exacerbate the static and dynamic inefficiency of market outcomes. More generally, our model demonstrates that intuitions about market competition can be upended when competition is intermediated by a strategic policymaker. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Market and political power Political influence Market competition Arrow effect |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16210-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546018 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Dana Foarta,Steven Callander,Takuo Sugaya. DP16210 Market Competition and Political Influence: An Integrated Approach. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
