| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17065 |
| DP17065 Learning in the Marriage Market: The Economics of Dating | |
| Yair Antler; Daniel Bird; Daniel Fershtman | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a dynamic model of two-sided matching with search and learning frictions. Agents engage in a search for a potential partner and, upon meeting, may gradually acquire information about their compatibility as a couple, a process we refer to as dating. Dating is mutually exclusive and, as such, introduces a tradeoff between becoming better informed about one's compatibility with a potential partner and meeting other, more promising, potential partners. We derive a closed-form solution for the unique steady-state equilibrium when agents are ex-ante homogeneous, and characterize it when they are vertically heterogeneous. In the steady state, agents date for longer than is socially optimal, an inefficiency that is alleviated by a small degree of asymmetry in dating costs between partners. Furthermore, block segregation fails, yet matching is assortative - in a probabilistic sense we refer to as single-crossing in marriage probabilities. Motivated by recent advances in matching technologies in decentralized markets, we study the effects of improvements in search and learning technologies and show that they differ qualitatively. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Search Matching Gradual learning Dating Marriage market |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17065 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546027 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yair Antler,Daniel Bird,Daniel Fershtman. DP17065 Learning in the Marriage Market: The Economics of Dating. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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