| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17004 |
| DP17004 Making Subsidies Work: Rules vs. Discretion | |
| Federico Cingano; Filippo Palomba; paolo pinotti; Enrico Rettore | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-02-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We estimate the employment effects of a large program of public investment subsidies that ranked applications on a score reflecting both objective criteria and local politicians' preferences. Leveraging the rationing of funds as an ideal RDD, we characterize the heterogeneity of treatment effects and cost-per-new-job across inframarginal firms, and we estimate the cost effectiveness of subsidies under factual and counterfactual allocations. Firms ranking high on objective criteria and firms preferred by local politicians generated larger employment growth on average, but the latter did so at a higher cost-per-job. We estimate that relying only on objective criteria would reduce the cost-per-job by 11%, while relying only on political discretion would increase such cost by 47%. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Political Economy |
| 关键词 | Public subsidies investment Employment Political discretion Regression discontinuity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17004-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546035 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Federico Cingano,Filippo Palomba,paolo pinotti,et al. DP17004 Making Subsidies Work: Rules vs. Discretion. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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