| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP16991
|
| DP16991 Production Agreements, Sustainability Investments, and Consumer Welfare |
| yossi spiegel; Leonard Treuren
|
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-08
|
| 出版年 | 2022
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Schinkel and Spiegel (2017) finds that allowing sustainability agreements in which firms coordinate their investments in sustainability leads to lower investments and lower output. By contrast, allowing production agreements, in which firms coordinate output yet continue to compete on investments, boosts investments in sustainability and may also benefit consumers. We extend these results to the case where investments affect not only the consumers willingness to pay, but also marginal cost. We show that sustainability agreements continue to lower investments and output levels, while production agreements increase investments but when they benefit consumers, they are not profitable for firms and will therefore not be formed. This implies that exempting horizontal agreements from the cartel prohibition cannot be relied on to advance sustainability goals and satisfy the competition law requirement that consumers must not be worse off. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Sustainability
investment
Horizontal agreement
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| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16991-0
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546062
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
yossi spiegel,Leonard Treuren. DP16991 Production Agreements, Sustainability Investments, and Consumer Welfare. 2022.
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