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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP17107 |
DP17107 Tournaments with Reserve Performance | |
Mikhail Drugov; Dmitry Ryvkin; Jun Zhang | |
发表日期 | 2022-03-14 |
出版年 | 2022 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We study tournaments where winning a rank-dependent prize requires passing a reserve - a minimum performance standard. Agents' performance is determined by effort and noise. For log-concave noise distributions the optimal reserve is at the modal performance, and the optimal prize scheme is winner-take-all. In contrast, for log-convex noise distributions the optimal reserve is at the lower bound of the distribution of performance, which is passed with probability one in equilibrium, and it is optimal to award equal prizes to all qualifying agents. These pay schemes are optimal in a general class of symmetric monotone contracts that may depend on cardinal performance. |
主题 | Organizational Economics |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17107 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546082 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mikhail Drugov,Dmitry Ryvkin,Jun Zhang. DP17107 Tournaments with Reserve Performance. 2022. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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