G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP17107
DP17107 Tournaments with Reserve Performance
Mikhail Drugov; Dmitry Ryvkin; Jun Zhang
发表日期2022-03-14
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We study tournaments where winning a rank-dependent prize requires passing a reserve - a minimum performance standard. Agents' performance is determined by effort and noise. For log-concave noise distributions the optimal reserve is at the modal performance, and the optimal prize scheme is winner-take-all. In contrast, for log-convex noise distributions the optimal reserve is at the lower bound of the distribution of performance, which is passed with probability one in equilibrium, and it is optimal to award equal prizes to all qualifying agents. These pay schemes are optimal in a general class of symmetric monotone contracts that may depend on cardinal performance.
主题Organizational Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp17107
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546082
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Mikhail Drugov,Dmitry Ryvkin,Jun Zhang. DP17107 Tournaments with Reserve Performance. 2022.
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