| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17109 |
| DP17109 How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-14 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A buyer wants to purchase an innovative good from a seller. Both parties are risk-neutral, and payments from the buyer to the seller must be non-negative. After the contract is signed, the seller privately observes a signal, which may be informative about the seller's costs. We compare two contracting regimes. In the case of specific performance, the courts enforce the trade level specified in the contract. In the case of at-will contracting, the seller is free to walk away from the contract after the signal has been realized. While the buyer prefers specific performance and the seller prefers at-will contracting, the optimal regime from an economic efficiency point-of-view depends on the informativeness of the signal. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Contract theory Specific performance At-will contracts Asymmetric information Ex-post inefficiencies |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17109 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546084 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP17109 How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts. 2022. |
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