| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17120 |
| DP17120 Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games | |
| Jean Barthélemy; Eric Mengus | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-18 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Time-inconsistency may lead governments to face multiple equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, we determine the minimum cost that a government should incur when deviating from commitments -- e.g., through rules or delegations -- to implement a unique outcome. We show that a large cost is needed only when bold policy responses change private agents' actions -- e.g., due to bounded rationality -- or when the private sector can distort government's ex-post incentives -- e.g., through trigger strategies. Otherwise, a small cost of deviation is sufficient for the government to implement its desired outcome. We derive implications for models of bailouts, inflation bias, and capital taxation. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance ; Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| 关键词 | Implementation Limited commitment Policy rules |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17120 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546095 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Barthélemy,Eric Mengus. DP17120 Time-consistent implementation in macroeconomic games. 2022. |
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