| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16841 |
| DP16841 Supervision without Regulation: Discount Limits at the Austro-Hungarian Bank, 1909-1913 | |
| Kilian Rieder; Clemens Jobst | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-22 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that European central banks used credit limits for discount loans as a means to enforce supervisory standards long before they had any formal regulatory powers. Drawing on novel micro data from the Austro-Hungarian Bank's archives, we document that credit limits were continuously monitored and that their size was contingent on counterparties' liquidity and capital position. Counterparties had an incentive-compatible economic motive to abide by informal prudential "rules of the game": higher credit limits enabled counterparties to streamline their day-to-day liquidity management. We exploit the heterogeneous exposure of counterparties to an exogenous liquidity shock to evidence that the Bank relaxed credit limits during crises to fulfill its role as a lender of last resort. |
| 主题 | Economic History ; Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Lender of last resort Banking regulation Central bank lending Liquidity crisis Credit limits |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16841-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546104 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kilian Rieder,Clemens Jobst. DP16841 Supervision without Regulation: Discount Limits at the Austro-Hungarian Bank, 1909-1913. 2022. |
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