| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17140 |
| DP17140 Unilateral Practices, Antitrust Enforcement and Commitments | |
| Michele Polo; Patrick Rey | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-03-25 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses the impact of commitments on antitrust enforcement. These tools, introduced in Europe by the Modernization reform of 2003, are now used intensively by the European Commission and by National Competition Agencies. We consider a setting where a firm can adopt a practice that is either pro- or anti-competitive; the firm knows the nature of the practice whereas the enforcer has only prior beliefs about it. If the firm adopts the practice, the enforcer then decides whether to open a case. When commitments are available, the firm can offer a commitment whenever a case is opened; the enforcer then decides whether to accept it or run a costly investigation that may or may not bring supporting evidence. We show that introducing commitments weakens enforcement when the practice is likely to be anti-competitive. The impact of commitments is however more nuanced when the practice is less likely to be anti-competitive. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Antitrust enforcement Commitment Remedies Deterrence |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17140 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546124 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michele Polo,Patrick Rey. DP17140 Unilateral Practices, Antitrust Enforcement and Commitments. 2022. |
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