G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP17140
DP17140 Unilateral Practices, Antitrust Enforcement and Commitments
Michele Polo; Patrick Rey
发表日期2022-03-25
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要This paper analyses the impact of commitments on antitrust enforcement. These tools, introduced in Europe by the Modernization reform of 2003, are now used intensively by the European Commission and by National Competition Agencies. We consider a setting where a firm can adopt a practice that is either pro- or anti-competitive; the firm knows the nature of the practice whereas the enforcer has only prior beliefs about it. If the firm adopts the practice, the enforcer then decides whether to open a case. When commitments are available, the firm can offer a commitment whenever a case is opened; the enforcer then decides whether to accept it or run a costly investigation that may or may not bring supporting evidence. We show that introducing commitments weakens enforcement when the practice is likely to be anti-competitive. The impact of commitments is however more nuanced when the practice is less likely to be anti-competitive.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Antitrust enforcement Commitment Remedies Deterrence
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp17140
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546124
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Michele Polo,Patrick Rey. DP17140 Unilateral Practices, Antitrust Enforcement and Commitments. 2022.
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