| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17178 |
| DP17178 Political Power and Market Power | |
| Andrea Prat; Tommaso Valletti; Bo Cowgill | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-04-04 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the link between political influence and industrial concentration. A model of firm lobbying shows that concentration and regulation may be either strategic complements or substitutes. Using data for the past 20 years in the US, we study whether merging firms’ influence activity increases or decreases after a merger. We document an increase in lobbying activity and we find some evidence for an increase in campaign contributions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics ; Political Economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17178 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546172 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrea Prat,Tommaso Valletti,Bo Cowgill. DP17178 Political Power and Market Power. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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