| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17181 |
| DP17181 Loss Aversion and Conspicuous Consumption in Networks | |
| Yann Bramoullé; Christian Ghiglino | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-04-05 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We introduce loss aversion into a model of conspicuous consumption in networks. Agents allocate their income between a standard good and a status good to maximize a Cobb-Douglas utility. Agents interact over a connected network and compare their status consumption to their neighbors’ average consumption. Loss aversion has a profound impact. If loss aversion is large enough relative to income heterogeneity, a continuum of Nash equilibria appears and all agents consume the same quantity of status good. Otherwise, there is a unique Nash equilibrium and richest agents earn strict status gains while poorest agents earn strict status losses. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Loss aversion Conspicuous consumption Social Networks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17181 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546175 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yann Bramoullé,Christian Ghiglino. DP17181 Loss Aversion and Conspicuous Consumption in Networks. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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