G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP17182
DP17182 Are Managers Paid for Market Power?
Jan Eeckhout; Jan De Loecker; Renjie Bao
发表日期2022-04-05
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要To answer the question whether managers are paid for market power, we propose a theory of executive compensation in an economy where firms have market power, and the market for man- agers is competitive. We identify two distinct channels that contribute to manager pay in the model: market power and firm size. Both increase the profitability of the firm, which makes managers more valuable as it increases their marginal product. Using data on executive compensation from Compustat, we quantitatively analyze how market power affects Manager Pay and how it changes over time. We attribute on average 45.8% of Manager Pay to market power, from 38.0% in 1994 to 48.8% in 2019. Over this period, market power accounts for 57.8% of growth. We also find there is a lot of heterogeneity within the distribution of managers. For the top managers, 80.3% of their pay in 2019 is due to market power. Top managers are hired disproportionately by firms with market power, and they get rewarded for it, increasingly so.
主题Labour Economics ; Macroeconomics and Growth ; Organizational Economics
关键词market power Manager pay Executive compensation Markups Reallocation Superstars
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp17182
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546176
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jan Eeckhout,Jan De Loecker,Renjie Bao. DP17182 Are Managers Paid for Market Power?. 2022.
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