| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14854 |
| DP14854 Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat | |
| Igor Letina; Shuo Liu; Nick Netzer | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-04-07 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider the design of contests when the principal can choose both the prize profile and how the prizes are allocated as a function of a possibly noisy signal about the agents’ efforts. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee optimality of a contest. Optimal contests have a minimally competitive prize profile and an intermediate degree of competitiveness in the contest success function. Whenever observation is not too noisy, the optimum can be achieved by an all-pay auction with a cap. When observation is perfect, the optimum can also be achieved by a nested Tullock contest. We relate our results to a recent literature which has asked similar questions but has typically focused on the design of either the prize profile or the contest success function. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contest design Optimal contests Tournaments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14854-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546181 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Igor Letina,Shuo Liu,Nick Netzer. DP14854 Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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