| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17201 |
| DP17201 On the Political Economy of Autocratic Land Reform | |
| Rob Davies; Halvor Mehlum; Ragnar Torvik | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-04-09 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We explore how autocratic land reforms can be used to prevent democratic change. The autocrat confiscates and redistributes land in an attempt to secure his power, exploiting the endogenous social identities and loyalty in the population. His optimal land reform balances the benefits of giving land to members of the elite to strengthen their support with the benefits of giving land to tillers to reduce their opposition against the autocratic rule. We show how autocratic land redistribution is more likely to increase land inequality further, the more unequal the land distribution is in the first place. While land to tillers is allocated in a way that increases inequality among them, land to the elite is allocated in a way that reduces the inequality within the elite. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Political Economy ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Land reform Autocracy Political economy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17201 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546196 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rob Davies,Halvor Mehlum,Ragnar Torvik. DP17201 On the Political Economy of Autocratic Land Reform. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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