G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP17201
DP17201 On the Political Economy of Autocratic Land Reform
Rob Davies; Halvor Mehlum; Ragnar Torvik
发表日期2022-04-09
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We explore how autocratic land reforms can be used to prevent democratic change. The autocrat confiscates and redistributes land in an attempt to secure his power, exploiting the endogenous social identities and loyalty in the population. His optimal land reform balances the benefits of giving land to members of the elite to strengthen their support with the benefits of giving land to tillers to reduce their opposition against the autocratic rule. We show how autocratic land redistribution is more likely to increase land inequality further, the more unequal the land distribution is in the first place. While land to tillers is allocated in a way that increases inequality among them, land to the elite is allocated in a way that reduces the inequality within the elite.
主题Development Economics ; Political Economy ; Public Economics
关键词Land reform Autocracy Political economy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp17201
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546196
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rob Davies,Halvor Mehlum,Ragnar Torvik. DP17201 On the Political Economy of Autocratic Land Reform. 2022.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Rob Davies]的文章
[Halvor Mehlum]的文章
[Ragnar Torvik]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Rob Davies]的文章
[Halvor Mehlum]的文章
[Ragnar Torvik]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Rob Davies]的文章
[Halvor Mehlum]的文章
[Ragnar Torvik]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。