| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP17235
|
| DP17235 Corporate Governance, Favoritism and Careers |
| Marco Pagano; Luca Picariello
|
| 发表日期 | 2022-04-19
|
| 出版年 | 2022
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Careers are often shaped by favoritism, even though this undermines the performance of firms. When controlling shareholders weigh the efficiency costs of favoritism against its private benefits, the quality of corporate governance enhances meritocratic promotions and so encourages workers’ skill acquisition. The impact of labor market competition, however, is ambiguous: by raising wages upon promotion, it fosters the supply of skilled labor but lowers the demand for it. With endogenous skill acquisition, there are multiple equilibria, and social welfare increases with the share of meritocratic firms. This brings out a new efficiency rationale for enhancing the quality of corporate governance. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Corporate governance
Careers
Favoritism
Merit
Job selection
Skill development
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17235
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546238
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Marco Pagano,Luca Picariello. DP17235 Corporate Governance, Favoritism and Careers. 2022.
|
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