| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17262 |
| DP17262 Socially Responsible Divestment | |
| Alex Edmans; Doron Levit | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-04-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Blanket exclusion of "brown" stocks is seen as the best way to reduce their negative externalities, by starving them of capital and hindering their expansion. We show that a more effective strategy may be tilting -- holding a brown stock if it is best-in-class, i.e. has taken a corrective action. While such holdings allow the firm to expand, they also encourage the corrective action. We derive conditions under which tilting dominates exclusion for externality reduction. If the corrective action is unobservable to the market, the investor is unable to tilt even if she has perfect information -- doing so would lead her to hold a company that has taken the action but the market thinks it has not, leading to accusations of greenwashing. Even if managers can costlessly disclose a signal of their actions, they will only do so under certain circumstances, and even a manager intending to take the action will only disclose a noisy signal. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Socially responsible investing Sustainable investing Externalities Exclusion Divestment Tilting Exit Governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17262 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546276 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alex Edmans,Doron Levit. DP17262 Socially Responsible Divestment. 2022. |
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