| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP16352 |
| DP16352 Creating controversy in proxy voting advice | |
| Andrey Malenko; Nadya Malenko; Chester Spatt | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-12 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the design of recommendations (available to all shareholders) and research reports (available only to subscribers) by a proxy advisor, who maximizes profits from selling information to shareholders. We show that the advisor benefits from biasing its recommendations against the a priori more likely alternative, thereby "creating controversy" for the vote. In contrast, it serves the advisor's interest to produce precise and unbiased research reports. Our results help reinterpret empirical patterns of shareholders' voting behavior, suggesting that proxy advisors' recommendations may not be a suitable benchmark for evaluating shareholders' votes. Our model also rationalizes the one-size-fits-all approach in recommendations. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Proxy advisor Voting Sale of information Information design Bayesian persuasion Controversy Bias Corporate governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp16352-1 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546328 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrey Malenko,Nadya Malenko,Chester Spatt. DP16352 Creating controversy in proxy voting advice. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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