| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17303 |
| DP17303 The Allocation of Incentives in Multi-Layered Organizations | |
| Stefano Caria; Erika Deserranno; Gianmarco Leon-Ciliotta; Philipp Kastrau | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-12 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A classic problem faced by organizations is to decide how to distribute incentives among their different layers. By means of a field experiment with a large public-health organization in Sierra Leone, we show that financial incentives maximize output when they are equally shared between frontline health workers and their supervisor. The impact of this intervention on completed health visits is 61% larger than the impact of incentive schemes that target exclusively the worker or the supervisor. Also, the shared incentives uniquely improve overall health-service provision and health outcomes. We use these experimental results to structurally estimate a model of service provision and find that shared incentives are effective because worker and supervisor effort are strong strategic complements, and because side payments across layers are limited. Through the use of counterfactual model experiments, we highlight the importance of effort complementarities across the different layers of an organization for optimal policy design. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17303 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546330 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stefano Caria,Erika Deserranno,Gianmarco Leon-Ciliotta,et al. DP17303 The Allocation of Incentives in Multi-Layered Organizations. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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