| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17307 |
| DP17307 The Limits of Commitment | |
| Jacopo Bizzotto; Toomas Hinnosaar; Adrien Vigier | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-14 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose her action set from a menu of options. We fully characterize for a large class of settings the set of equilibrium outcomes obtained when varying the degree of commitment that the leader has. We identify conditions under which giving more commitment power to the leader could end up making her worse off. Moreover, with partial commitment, the follower might obtain a larger payoff than the leader even in settings where the latter possesses a first-mover advantage under full commitment. We explore the implications of our analysis for oligopolies. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Commitment Sequential games Stackelberg competition Robustness |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17307 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546336 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jacopo Bizzotto,Toomas Hinnosaar,Adrien Vigier. DP17307 The Limits of Commitment. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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