G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP17307
DP17307 The Limits of Commitment
Jacopo Bizzotto; Toomas Hinnosaar; Adrien Vigier
发表日期2022-05-14
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose her action set from a menu of options. We fully characterize for a large class of settings the set of equilibrium outcomes obtained when varying the degree of commitment that the leader has. We identify conditions under which giving more commitment power to the leader could end up making her worse off. Moreover, with partial commitment, the follower might obtain a larger payoff than the leader even in settings where the latter possesses a first-mover advantage under full commitment. We explore the implications of our analysis for oligopolies.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Commitment Sequential games Stackelberg competition Robustness
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp17307
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546336
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jacopo Bizzotto,Toomas Hinnosaar,Adrien Vigier. DP17307 The Limits of Commitment. 2022.
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