G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP17312
DP17312 Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation
Venkataraman Bhaskar; Wojciech Olszewski
发表日期2022-05-16
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Consequently, monitoring is noisy and private. We focus on equilibria that are robust to small payoff shocks. Existing constructions to support effort fail to be equilibria in the presence of payoff shocks -- there is no equilibrium where the agent always exerts effort on the equilibrium path. Allowing the principal and agent to make simultaneous cheap-talk announcements at the end of each period makes some effort sustainable in a purifiable equilibrium. Payoffs arbitrarily close to fully efficient ones can be achieved in equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient. In contrast to earlier constructions, bonus targets are non-trivial and employee self-evaluation is critical.
主题Organizational Economics
关键词Private monitoring Repeated games Relational contracts
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp17312
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546342
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Venkataraman Bhaskar,Wojciech Olszewski. DP17312 Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation. 2022.
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