| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17312 |
| DP17312 Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation | |
| Venkataraman Bhaskar; Wojciech Olszewski | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-16 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Consequently, monitoring is noisy and private. We focus on equilibria that are robust to small payoff shocks. Existing constructions to support effort fail to be equilibria in the presence of payoff shocks -- there is no equilibrium where the agent always exerts effort on the equilibrium path. Allowing the principal and agent to make simultaneous cheap-talk announcements at the end of each period makes some effort sustainable in a purifiable equilibrium. Payoffs arbitrarily close to fully efficient ones can be achieved in equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient. In contrast to earlier constructions, bonus targets are non-trivial and employee self-evaluation is critical. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| 关键词 | Private monitoring Repeated games Relational contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17312 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546342 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Venkataraman Bhaskar,Wojciech Olszewski. DP17312 Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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