G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP17314
DP17314 Tying under Double-Marginalization
Roman Inderst; Fabian Griem; Greg Schaffer
发表日期2022-05-17
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要In a model of contractual inefficiencies due to double-marginalization, we analyze the practice of tied rebates that incentivizes retailers to purchase multiple products from the same manufacturer. We isolate two opposing effects: a surplus-sharing effect that enhances efficiency and a rent-extraction effect that reduces efficiency. The overall effect is more likely to be negative when the manufacturer has a particularly strong brand for which the retailers alternatives are much inferior. Foreclosure of a more efficient provider of the manufacturers weaker product is not a sufficient condition for a welfare loss. Our key positive implication relates to the seemingly inefficient introduction of weaker products by the owners of particularly strong brands.
主题Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics
关键词Contractual inefficiencies Double-marginalization Competition Surplus-sharing effect Rent-extraction effect Efficiency Brand strength
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp17314
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546345
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Roman Inderst,Fabian Griem,Greg Schaffer. DP17314 Tying under Double-Marginalization. 2022.
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