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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP17314 |
DP17314 Tying under Double-Marginalization | |
Roman Inderst; Fabian Griem; Greg Schaffer | |
发表日期 | 2022-05-17 |
出版年 | 2022 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In a model of contractual inefficiencies due to double-marginalization, we analyze the practice of tied rebates that incentivizes retailers to purchase multiple products from the same manufacturer. We isolate two opposing effects: a surplus-sharing effect that enhances efficiency and a rent-extraction effect that reduces efficiency. The overall effect is more likely to be negative when the manufacturer has a particularly strong brand for which the retailers alternatives are much inferior. Foreclosure of a more efficient provider of the manufacturers weaker product is not a sufficient condition for a welfare loss. Our key positive implication relates to the seemingly inefficient introduction of weaker products by the owners of particularly strong brands. |
主题 | Industrial Organization ; Organizational Economics |
关键词 | Contractual inefficiencies Double-marginalization Competition Surplus-sharing effect Rent-extraction effect Efficiency Brand strength |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17314 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546345 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst,Fabian Griem,Greg Schaffer. DP17314 Tying under Double-Marginalization. 2022. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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