| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17319 |
| DP17319 Who to Listen to?: A Model of Endogenous Delegation | |
| William Fuchs; Satoshi Fukuda; SeyedMahyar Sefidgaran | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-20 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two privately-informed agents must take a joint action without resorting to sidepayments. Size and location of the support of each agent's private types (their preferred action) determine the degree of conflict. Under high conflict, it is too costly to elicit agents' information, which leads to an optimal constant allocation. Delegation arises endogenously when there is conflict and asymmetry in the amount of private information. The agent with more private information dictates the allocation within somebounds. When supports overlap information is shared and sometimes ex-post inefficient actions are optimally taken. Welfare relative to the rst-best is non-monotone in conflict. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17319 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546352 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | William Fuchs,Satoshi Fukuda,SeyedMahyar Sefidgaran. DP17319 Who to Listen to?: A Model of Endogenous Delegation. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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