| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP13055 |
| DP13055 Bribes vs. Taxes: Market Structure and Incentives | |
| Francesco Amodio; Giacomo DE GIORGI; Aminur Rahman | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-27 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Firms in developing countries often avoid paying taxes by making informal payments to tax officials. These bribes may raise the cost of operating a business, and the price charged to consumers. To decrease these costs, we designed a feedback incentive scheme for business tax inspectors that rewards them according to the anonymous evaluation submitted by inspected firms. We show theoretically that feedback incentives decrease the equilibrium bribe amount, but make firms with more inelastic demand more attractive for inspectors. A tilted scheme that attaches higher weights to the evaluation of smaller firms limits the scope for targeting and decreases the bribe amount to a lesser extent. We evaluate both schemes in a field experiment in the Kyrgyz Republic and find evidence that is consistent with the model predictions. By decreasing bribes, our intervention reduces the average cost for firms and the price they charge to consumers. Since fewer firms substitute bribes for taxes, tax revenues increase. Our study highlights the role of firm heterogeneity and market structure in shaping the relationship between firms and tax inspectors, and provides clear evidence of pass-through of bribes to consumers. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Business tax Incentives Market structure Demand elasticity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp13055-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546365 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Amodio,Giacomo DE GIORGI,Aminur Rahman. DP13055 Bribes vs. Taxes: Market Structure and Incentives. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
