G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP16884
DP16884 Competitive Search and the Social Value of Public Information
Piotr Denderski; Eeva Mauring
发表日期2022-05-28
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要We study the social value of public information in an economy with competitive search and aggregate risk. While perfect information is always optimal, marginal effects of information can be positive, negative or neutral for trade. Equilibria featuring inefficient price dispersion, or the absence of trades in some states of the world, can arise. The salient features of the matching function and aggregate risk matter for how information affects the equilibrium. We also find that entry is in general inefficient.
主题Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics
关键词Competitive search Public information Aggregate risk Uncertainty shocks transparency Price dispersion
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp16884-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546370
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Piotr Denderski,Eeva Mauring. DP16884 Competitive Search and the Social Value of Public Information. 2022.
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