| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17336 |
| DP17336 Public versus Secret Voting in Committees | |
| Andrea Mattozzi; Marcos Y. Nakaguma | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-05-29 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effect of transparency of individual votes in committees where members are heterogeneous in competence and bias, they are career-concerned, and they can abstain. We show that public voting attenuates the biases of competent members and secret voting attenuates the biases of incompetent members. Public voting leads to better decisions when the magnitude of the bias is large, while secret voting performs better otherwise. We present novel experimental evidence consistent with our theory. |
| 主题 | Political Economy |
| 关键词 | Committees Voting Career-concern transparency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17336 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546378 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrea Mattozzi,Marcos Y. Nakaguma. DP17336 Public versus Secret Voting in Committees. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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