G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP17039
DP17039 Double Auctions and Transaction Costs
Simon Jantschgi; Bary Pradelski; Marek Pycia
发表日期2022-05-31
出版年2022
语种英语
摘要Transaction costs are omnipresent in markets but are often omitted in economic models. We show that the presence of transaction costs can fundamentally alter incentive and welfare properties of Double Auctions, a canonical market organization. We further show that transaction costs can be categorized into two types. Double Auctions with homogeneous transaction costs—a category that includes fixed fees and price based fees—preserve the key advantages of Double Auctions without transaction costs: markets with homogeneous transaction costs are asymptotically strategyproof, and there is no efficiency-loss due to strategic behavior. In contrast, double auctions with heterogeneous transaction costs—such as spread fees—lead to complex strategic behavior (price guessing) and may result in severe market failures. Allowing for aggregate uncertainty, we extend these insights to market organizations other than Double Auctions.
主题Organizational Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp17039-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546386
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Simon Jantschgi,Bary Pradelski,Marek Pycia. DP17039 Double Auctions and Transaction Costs. 2022.
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