| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP15288 |
| DP15288 Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation | |
| Viral Acharya; Cecilia Parlatore Siritto; Suresh M Sundaresan | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the optimal financing of infrastructure when governments have limited financial commitment and can expropriate rents from private sector firms that manage infrastructure. While private firms need incentives to implement projects well, governments need incentives to limit expropriation. This double moral hazard limits the willingness of outside investors to fund infrastructure projects. Optimal financing involves government guarantees to investors against project failure to incentivize the government to commit not to expropriate which improves private sector incentives and project quality. The model captures several other features prevalent in infrastructure financing such as government co-investment, tax subsidies, development rights, and cross-guarantees. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Double moral hazard Public private partnerships Government guarantees Development rights General obligation bonds Revenue only bonds |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp15288-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546392 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral Acharya,Cecilia Parlatore Siritto,Suresh M Sundaresan. DP15288 Financing Infrastructure in the Shadow of Expropriation. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
