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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP17349 |
DP17349 Competing Diffusions in a Social Network | |
Arthur Campbell; Matthew Leister; Yves Zenou | |
发表日期 | 2022-06-02 |
出版年 | 2022 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We develop a model of competing diffusions of goods on a social network. There are two types of goods and individuals: mass-market (more prevalent) and niche-market. We start with a general threshold rule and show that multiple equilibria prevail. Then, when everyone uses a single friend threshold, we find that there is a unique stable steady state and show that the adoption of a mass-market good is greater than its population share. Furthermore, greater connectivity and homophily in the social network will concurrently increase the prevalence of niche-market goods. If there is a strategic agent who wants to promote a niche good, she will invest more in influencing activities than one promoting mass-market goods. When individuals choose their degree of homophily, we show that niche-market individuals exhibit greater homophily than mass-market ones. Finally, we address the issue of political polarization by extending our model to competition on a line with three different political ideologies (left, middle, and right). We show that the pairwise advantage of the middle ideology can enforce amplification of the middle type when it is the more prevalent type or counteract the amplification of the extremes when these are more prevalent. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Social Networks Threshold models Homophily Diffusion Information transmission Influencers |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17349 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546398 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Arthur Campbell,Matthew Leister,Yves Zenou. DP17349 Competing Diffusions in a Social Network. 2022. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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