| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17350 |
| DP17350 Price Competition with a Stake in your Rival | |
| Sandro Shelegia; Andres Hervas-Drane | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-06 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine how revenue-sharing and profit-sharing stakes affect price competition intensity under duopoly. Our analysis builds on the price competition framework introduced by Varian (1980) and accounts for fundamental asymmetries in terms of cost and consumer loyalty. A stake exists when a firm appropriates a share of its rival’s revenues or profits. For example, a marketplace owner that charges a third-party seller an ad valorem fee on its sales has a revenue-sharing stake, and a firm holding a minority ownership participation in another has a profit-sharing stake. We show that a revenue-sharing stake always has a stronger competition-dampening effect (leads to higher prices) than a profit-sharing stake, and explain how the introduction of a stake affects the intensity of competition between firms. Our analysis generates new insight into how stakes affect competitive interaction in the marketplace. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Nue-sharing Ad valorem fees Profit-sharing Cross-ownership Price dispersion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17350-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546410 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sandro Shelegia,Andres Hervas-Drane. DP17350 Price Competition with a Stake in your Rival. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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