| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17407 |
| DP17407 The Central Bank, the Treasury, or the Market: Which One Determines the Price Level? | |
| Guillaume Plantin; Eric Mengus; Jean Barthélemy | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-25 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies a model in which the price level is the outcome of dynamic strategic interactions between a fiscal authority, a monetary authority, and investors in government bonds and reserves. The “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”, whereby aggressive fiscal expansion forces the monetary authority to chicken out and to lose control of inflation, occurs only if the public sector lacks fiscal space, in the sense that public debt along the optimal fiscal path gets sufficiently close to the threshold above which the fiscal authority would find default optimal. Otherwise, monetary dominance prevails even though the central bank has neither commitment power nor fiscal backing. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17407 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546478 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guillaume Plantin,Eric Mengus,Jean Barthélemy. DP17407 The Central Bank, the Treasury, or the Market: Which One Determines the Price Level?. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
