| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17413 |
| DP17413 When do proxy advisors improve corporate decisions? | |
| Berno Buechel; Lydia Mechtenberg; Alexander F. Wagner | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-28 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | There is an ongoing debate about how proxy advisory firms affect corporate decisions. A major concern is that shareholders seeking to save costs use a proxy advisor's vote recommendation as substitute for own research, thereby reducing efficiency of shareholder decision-making. We show that the opposite effect -- complementarity between a proxy advisor's recommendation and shareholders' research efforts -- occurs if two conditions are met: (i) the board of directors is sufficiently well informed; and (ii) shareholders can condition their investment in research on the proxy advisor's recommendation. Then, a proxy advisor with information quality sufficiently close to that of the board strictly improves corporate decisions, while a proxy advisor with a more diverging information quality leaves corporate decisions unaffected. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Proxy advisors Strategic voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17413 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546488 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Berno Buechel,Lydia Mechtenberg,Alexander F. Wagner. DP17413 When do proxy advisors improve corporate decisions?. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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