| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP14906 |
| DP14906 Random Power to Parties and Policies in Coalition Governments | |
| Matteo Cervellati; Giorgio Gulino; Paolo Roberti | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We exploit a natural experiment involving a randomization of votes across parties within coalitions in all local elections in Italy for over a decade. A lottery on the position of party symbols in the ballot papers coupled with a behavioral focal point allows estimating the average treatment effect of parties for coalition policies. A non-marginal boost of votes shifts budgetary spending towards the treated party's platform, but only for issues that are salient in that party's political manifesto. The effects are stronger for more divisive electoral issues like welfare, taxes, and security. The mechanisms relate to perturbations of legislative representation within majorities that spills over to the appointment of cabinet members affiliated with parties. Empowering different parties leads to a selection of policymakers with different socio-demographic characteristics (particularly gender, age, and occupation). The unintentional experiment helps shed new light on the role of parties and their ideologies. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics and Growth |
| 关键词 | Coalition governments Party ideologies and policies Selection of executive politicians natural experiment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp14906-1 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546491 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matteo Cervellati,Giorgio Gulino,Paolo Roberti. DP14906 Random Power to Parties and Policies in Coalition Governments. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
