| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17418 |
| DP17418 Negotiating Compensation | |
| Florian Hoffmann; Vladimir Vladimirov | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate compensation design in tight labor markets. With private information about firm productivity, firms prefer competing for workers by raising fixed wages. However, workers in better bargaining positions often prefer negotiating for higher bonuses or option pay. We characterize when such differences in preferred compensation structure occur and show that they determine whether workers extract higher compensation by negotiating as opposed to attracting additional job offers. Our analysis of negotiations and competition with endogenous compensation structure has implications for firms' external financing needs and investor base and extends to other applications such as mergers and acquisitions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Competition for workers Negotiations Financing wages Compensation structure of non-executive employees High-skilled employees |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17418 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546499 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Florian Hoffmann,Vladimir Vladimirov. DP17418 Negotiating Compensation. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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