| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17419 |
| DP17419 Worker Runs | |
| Florian Hoffmann; Vladimir Vladimirov | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-06-30 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The voluntary departure of hard-to-replace skilled workers worsens firm prospects, thus, increasing remaining workers' incentives to leave. We develop a model of collective turnover in which firms design compensation to limit the risk of such "worker runs." To achieve cost-efficient retention, firms may use fixed or dilutable variable pay -- such as stock option/bonus pools -- that promises remaining workers more when others leave but gets diluted otherwise. The optimal mix of fixed and dilutable pay depends on firms' relative risk exposure and their financial constraints. Compensating (identical) workers differently and financing investments with debt can improve collective retention. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Compensation structure of non-executive employees High-skilled employees Contagious turnover Worker runs Worker bargaining power Financing labor |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17419 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546500 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Florian Hoffmann,Vladimir Vladimirov. DP17419 Worker Runs. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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