| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17428 |
| DP17428 A Dynamic Model of Predation | |
| Yossi Spiegel; Patrick Rey | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-03 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the feasibility and profitability of predation in a parsimonious infinite-horizon, complete information setting where an incumbent may face an entrant, in which case it needs to decide whether to accommodate or predate it. If the entrant exits, a new entrant is born with positive probability. We show that there always exists a Markov perfect equilibrium, which can be of three types: accommodation, predation with no future entry, and predation with hit-and-run entry. We use the model to study alternative antitrust policies, derive the best rules for these policies, and compare their welfare effects. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Predation Accommodation Entry Legal rules Markov perfect equilibrium |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17428 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546512 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Yossi Spiegel,Patrick Rey. DP17428 A Dynamic Model of Predation. 2022. |
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