| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP12645 |
| DP12645 Managing Relational Contracts | |
| Marta Troya Martinez; Liam Wren-Lewis | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-07 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm owner and a supplier. Yet, in a variety of organizations, relationships are overseen by an intermediary such as a manager. Such arrangements open the door for collusion between the manager and the agent. This paper develops a theory of such managed relational contracts. We show that managed relational contracts differ from principal-agent ones in important ways. First, kickbacks from the agent can help solve the manager's commitment problem. When commitment is difficult, this can result in higher agent effort than the principal could incentivize directly. Second, making relationships more valuable enables more collusion and hence can reduce effort. We also analyze the principal's delegation problem and show that she may or may not benefit from entrusting the relationship to a manager. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Relational contracts Delegation Corruption |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp12645-2 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546533 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marta Troya Martinez,Liam Wren-Lewis. DP12645 Managing Relational Contracts. 2022. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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