| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP17477 |
| DP17477 Norms and the evolution of leaders’ followership | |
| Esther Hauk | |
| 发表日期 | 2022-07-16 |
| 出版年 | 2022 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we model the interaction between leaders, their followers and crowd followers in a coordination game with local interaction. The steady states of a dynamic best-response process can feature a coexistence of Pareto dominant and risk dominant actions in the population. The existence of leaders and their followers, plus the local interaction, which leads to clustering, is crucial for the survival of the Pareto dominant actions. The evolution of leader and crowd followership shows that leader followership can also be locally stable around Pareto dominant leaders. The paper answers the questions (i) which Leader should be removed and (ii) how to optimally place leaders in the network to enhance payoff dominant play. |
| 主题 | Organizational Economics ; Political Economy ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp17477 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/546570 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Esther Hauk. DP17477 Norms and the evolution of leaders’ followership. 2022. |
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